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Established to promote a lasting peace between Lebanon, Israel, and Syria. |
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Bashar Al-Assad's Amateurism & The Failing Syrian Government The analysis below delineates Syria's falling status from a regional power as highlighted by Syria's recent withdrawal from the Beirut region. Many forces have pressured Syria into a retreat and the beginning of the end for Syria began in Washington DC in a private meeting, February 16, 2000, initiated by Mr. Najji N. Najjar, Director of the Lebanese Foundation for Peace. The meeting, I was present, took place in the bottom of the US Capitol Building. Numerous dignitaries were there, including a strong Congressional presence that involved Representative McCollum and Representative Saxton. Other dignitaries from the world over were well represented and special note must be given to the Baroness Cox of the English House of Lords. Dignitaries were also there directly from the Lebanese parliament as represented by MP Dory Chamoun as well as a representative of the Maronite Church Arch Bishop Paul Sayah. The gathering was private despite the failed efforts of uninvited members of the Lebanese Embassy to enter. They were rejected. This convening of hitherto individual efforts was the culmination of days of effort that resulted in an unprecedented joining of forces by all members who vowed to exert all necessary efforts to rid Lebanon of its illegal Syrian presence and return Lebanon to its position of a sovereign nation, with its historic balance of Christians and Muslims. Democracy, freedom, and honor, were the key ingredients. Prior to the meeting, numerous private meetings were held that bound the various Lebanese factions together into a coherent force that are united in their determination to return home. Some of the Participants Speaking at the Meeting
Excerpts from an Address by Congressman Bill McCollum to Private Meeting August 16, 2000Our addressing of the Lebanon issue is an expression of the greater dynamics in the region. However, in our rush to seek solutions to outstanding conflicts, we must ensure that the legitimate rights and interests of the Lebanese population are not sacrificed. And here lies a major challenge. Lebanon is Israel's only hot border, where the Israeli military and the Israel-sponsored South Lebanese Army encounter on a daily basis HizbAllah terrorists sponsored by Syria and Iran. Eager to reduce the IDF's attrition, Prime Minister Barak has made a withdrawal within a year, that is, by early July 2000, the primary measure of his government's success. The US shares Israel's desire to withdraw from Lebanon. Defusing the South Lebanon crisis is an urgent issue because for as long as terrorism and violence prevails there, a local provocation can quickly become the spark of another Arab-Israeli war. Further more, the conflicting interests of the key players - Israel and Syria - are further complicated by the succession crisis in Syria, the Iranian determination to maintain grip over the HizbAllah in Lebanon, and the domestic constraints of the Barak Government in Israel. Therefore, it is imperative for the US to sponsor an audacious though pragmatic solution to this lingering crisis before the entire Arab-Israeli peace process is threatened. Presently, the common wisdom is the key to the solution of the south Lebanon problem is in the context of a wider comprehensive Israeli peace agreement with Syria. The Clinton Administration strongly supports this venue. An integral part of such an agreement will legitimize the continuation of the Syrian occupation of Lebanon and with it Syria's ability to continue a myriad of activities that are adverse to the US national interests. Among these activities are the sponsorship of and active support for terrorism against our NATO ally Turkey, active support for and guidance of Iran-sponsored terrorism against Israel and the West, as well as drug trade and distribution of counterfeit US currency. Ultimately, however, irrespective of the merits or demerits of this proposed approach to an Israeli-Syrian peace agreement, there is yet another crucial factor we must not neglect - the situation in Syria itself. Syria is in a major crisis. Hafiz al-Assad's health is in a bad shape. He is desperate to ensure that his son Bashar succeeds him and for the US to provide for both averting the collapse of the Syrian economy and the payoffs to the Syrian elite Bashar must make in order not to be toppled. The US is also expected to replace the virtually free oil Syria now gets from Iran. By careful analysis, these financial requirements amount to billions a year. Hafiz al-Assad expected the US to legitimize the Syrian occupation of Lebanon, which will also clear the Syrian drug and counterfeit trade as well as the income they provide for the Syrian ruling elite. However, the Syrian ruling establishment, which is predominantly Allawite (a Shiite people that is a minority in predominantly Sunni Syria), is afraid of Bashar. He is young, weak and inexperienced. The Syrian elite is afraid, and not without reason, that once Hafiz al-Assad dies, the Syrian Islamists will rise up, overthrow and slaughter the Allawite elite, and establish a radical Sunni Islamist government in Damascus. Iran and an Islamist Damascus will then export Islamist subversion and instability to all other Arab countries including such US allies as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan. Islamist terrorism by such organizations as the HizbAllah, HAMAS and Islamic Jihad, all of whom are already sponsored by Syria and Iran, will also escalate. The only way to prevent the rise of such a radical Islamist regime in Damascus is by securing a strong Allawite-dominated regime something that Bashar is incapable of achieving despite all of his father's desperate grooming. The Syrian elite is fully aware of this prospect and indeed there is a major segment within the Syrian Allawite elite that is very pragmatic in addressing the forthcoming succession crisis. They believe that the only chance for the Allawite to remain in power (and thus survive slaughter by the Islamists) is by reversing the deterioration and near collapse of the Syrian economy. Only an economic upsurge can reverse the radicalization of the Sunni majority. And only improved relations with the US-led West can save the Syrian economy from an impending collapse. Therefore, in order to survive, this segment within the Syrian Allawite elite is willing to reach viable agreements on peaceful co-existence with Israel and a withdrawal from Lebanon in the context of the US removing the sanctions and normalization of relations. Significantly, this segment within the Syrian Allawite elite knows that the alternative to such a deal is their slaughter - for them it is literally a lifesaving deal. Therefore, the US should assist the responsible and pragmatic segments of the Allawite elite to come to power in a post-Assad Damascus. Meanwhile, the US and Israel should wait until this government redirects Syria's national policies and priorities, proves its commitment to policies of moderation and compromises, as well as economic reforms. Once stable, such a Syrian government will be capable of making long-term commitments. Only then it would possible for both Israel and Syria to reach enduring and genuine peace for the sake of peace. A high priority on Washington's agenda should be the forthwith removal of the Syrian forces from Lebanon and the reversal of vestiges of occupation such as removal of the million Syrian workers. Given the precarious condition of the Syrian economy, Damascus is most vulnerable to a robust regime of sanctions. Moreover, such added sanctions can also serve as further inducement for Damascus to empower the right government in the post-Assad era. The US, and the international community, has every right and obligation to pursue this policy under Security Council resolution 520. Taken together, the forcing of a Syrian withdrawal from the Lebanon and the establishment of springboard for a free Lebanon in the south could very well constitute the foundation for the economic recovery of Lebanon and ultimately its political liberation. Such a development can serve as a springboard for the ultimate liberation of all of Lebanon - leading to the restoration of a free and democratic Lebanon that will establish genuine warm peace with Israel. Therefore, the US should concentrate its efforts on helping the people of Lebanon become masters of their own destiny. Bashar Al-Assad's Amateurism & The Failing Syrian Government Questions have arisen concerning the stability of the Syrian regime under Bashar al-Assad as he clearly is in the midst of a power struggle for supremacy against those entrenched in power. What is happening in Syria? Who rules in Damascus? While many have questioned the efficacy of Bashar's new regime, the one issue that all agree on is an ongoing invisible struggle between the so-called "old guard" and Bashar's "new guard." Even within the "new guard," it must be emphasized that such cliques are not proof of the existence of a sense of common political ideology, since they consist of individuals who are out only to achieve their own aims. While they refer to themselves as "we," the pronoun only indicates a plurality devoid of any deeper sense. Informed sources point out that Bashar is ignoring the experienced members of the ruling Alawite party as they quietly oppose his efforts in initiating a war against Israel and many would prefer his replacement by his uncle Rifat. However, overt support of Rifat would result in their deaths and this explains the active underground in Syria and to a great extent in Lebanon. This split first started with rumors concerning a coup attempt following the Syrian president's sudden return from Sharm al-Shaykh and why the inter-Syrian conflict broke out first with a questionable and unprecedented Lebanese campaign against Defense Minister First Lieutenant General Mustafa Talas. In Beirut, Syria's friends and closest allies unexpectedly attacked General Talas after his statements to the press assailing Syria's enemies in Lebanon and the enemies of its Lebanese allies. Talas accused the Maronite Patriarch Sfeir of asking for Israeli assistance in 1983, which was countered by Talas' opponents as an error since Bishop Nasrallah Sufayr was not a patriarch at the time. Talas then attacked Druze leader Walid Junblatt by emphatically reminding him that it was Syria that supported his rise to power, when in fact the Junblatt's family leadership in Lebanon had existed long before the Ba'th Party was conceived. Talas is not the first Syrian official to attack prominent Lebanese leaders [Junblatt also demanded this] who demand Syria's withdrawal from Lebanon, the Patriarch demanded this, and/or the withdrawal of Syrian forces, and a halt to its interference in Lebanese affairs,. Defense Minister Talas launched severe attacks in his statements a few months ago and was congratulated by those who are now criticizing him. But why did Syria's allies beginning with Speaker Nabih Birri and Defense Minister Khalil al-Hirawi through Interior Minister Ilyas al-Murr publicly accuse First Lieutenant General Talas of not representing the Syrian leadership and described his releases as "unacceptable?" No Lebanese, no matter how ill informed, would go as far as regarding Birri, Al-Hirawi, and Al-Murr as defenders of Patriarch Sfeir and Junblatt and of freedom of expression in Lebanon. All that has happened had not truly been in defense of the Patriarch and Junblatt and was an attack on Talas as part of Lebanese involvement in an very sensitive internal Syrian gambit that again highlights the power struggle in Damascus by its removal ofthe immunity of First Lieutenant General Talas in such an unusual fashion. The major danger for the Syrian leadership is to allow its Lebanese allies to spread this dissension as it reveals the occurrence of an important coup in the balance of power, the decision- making positions, and the makeup of the authority in Damascus. High positioned Syrian sources admit the announcement by Nabih Birri, Syria's major ally in Lebanon, that First Lieutenant General Talas does not represent the Syrian leadership was equivalent to the first admission confirming Talas' exit from the leadership. This amazed many because they still recall the major role First Lieutenant General Mustafa Talas has taken since 1994 and the fact that he was the first to put forward the name of Dr. Bashar to replace the late Basil on the succession list. He also played the more important role in naming and nominating Dr. Bashar a few hours after his father's death. Other intelligence sources report of the war the defense minister waged against signs of the "old guard," foremost of whom is Vice President Abd-al-Halim Khaddam. The reports hint that Talas had taken command of a military group as a precaution against any contingency or any obstacles to Bashar al-Asad's succession. First Lieutenant General Talas has been regarded since that time as the leader and the strongman in Bashar al-Asad's team and was removed from the "old guard." His statements during the first six months of the new Syrian president's rule became important and influential and he appeared as the most prominent figure in the Syrian leadership that is close to Bashar al-Asad. According to a European diplomat who is in charge of studying the transfer of power and the process of change in Damascus, the continuing strategy of shrouding with mystery and imposing a blackout on what goes on inside the corridors of power in Damascus, Beirut has emerged as the stage for settling inter-Syrian accounts. This issue surfaced in Beirut and is the first disagreement between First Lieutenant General Mustafa Talas and Lieutenant General Ghazi Kan'an, head of security and reconnaissance for the Syrian forces in Lebanon, the actual supervisor of all the details of the Lebanese issue for many years,. A few weeks later, Damascus' allies in Lebanon received the "green light" to announce from outside Syria that First Lieutenant Talas no longer represented the Syrian leadership. Meanwhile, international analysts focused on expanding the list of Syria's loyalist allies in Lebanon who have been criticizing Talas; however, they have not been able to monitor any official or semi-official reaction that would clarify the picture and establish the fate of the defense minister and subsequently the manner by which the elitist power struggle in Damascus was settled. All these experts are convinced that the anti-Talas campaign in Lebanon could only be a indicative of a war that was being waged against him in Syria and possibly a bloody end to the war between the warring wings in Damascus. These experts know that none of the Lebanese who volunteered to reply to the statements by Talas, specifically Syrian defense minister, loyal and close friend of late President Hafiz al-Asad, and sponsor of the succession process for Bashar al-Asad, would dare respond. Western sources reveal that Bashar al-Asad's policy and the orientations of the new regime in Syria have started to intensify since the administration of George Bush junior entered the White House and the preparations for the launch of the new US strategy in the region and Syria's place in it. On the basis of this, the US Administration has instructed its embassies in Damascus and the region and its specialist agencies to prepare detailed reports about Bashar al-Asad's rule, the makeup of the power and decision-making, and the balance of power in Damascus. Diplomatic and intelligence reports that the Bush administration is deeply concerned with the repressive actions of Syria in Lebanon and Syria's support of terror groups such as HizbAllah. The U.S feels that Syrian actions such as moving their troops out of Yarze, Baabda, and other locations in Beirut and Mount Lebanon are purely cosmetic and of no meaning. Sources point out that if Syria continues their support of HizbAllah and other terror groups, the U.S. will have no choice but to support actions against Syria. These actions will be taken reluctantly but at this point, the U.S. feels that planning on Syria to assist in any action against Iraq is meaningless. As one intelligence source saidBashar's honeymoon period is over." Informed major capitals have started to blame Syrian hard line policy on the new guard surrounding the president and who have begun to seize the reigns of power. They are convinced the campaign against Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri and Druze leader Walid Junblatt, who are known for their relations with the 'old guard' such as Vice President Abd-al-Halim Khaddam and Lieutenant General Hikmat al-Shihabi and against Mustafa Talas, confirm the activities of the new guard. These campaigns of the "new guard," have begun to demonstrate its impact and influence on Syrian decisions. Some sources say that Bashar is trapped by his rhetoric and cannot withdraw or modify his decisions as that would mean a death sentence for him. The sources are in unanimity concerning this "new guard's" responsibility for the escalating and hard line rhetoric the Syrian president has adopted. Western intelligence and diplomatic sources describe the new group as responsible for the recent Syrian change as the "second line" and in actuality fomented by a "troika" composed of young military officers. They are Mahir al-Asad, brother of the Syrian president, Asif Shawkat, the president's brother-in-law, and Bahjat Sulayman, the intelligence chief who is close to the president. The latest reports indicate that Foreign Minister Faruq al-Shar'a represents the political front for this troika and some regard him as its most prominent figure along with Adnan Badr al-Hasan, head of political security. Additional information points out that this team has succeeded in diminishing the influence of the "old guard" and has started to seize the reigns of power. This information says that this team is also trying to convince Bashar to adopt a policy based on the "Chinese model." This means a new economic approach to resolve the differences between Syria's socialist economy and the need to enter a free market. A free market is necessary to overcome the country's economic crisis, while maintaining control over the internal political situation and working outside toward restoring Syria's regional and Pan-Arab role under the hard line wing. This group would benefit from Sharon's assumption of power in Israel and return the conflict in the region back to the starting point. A major problem Syria faces is their need of hard currency to replace and update their aging Soviet weapons and are willing to compromise their hard line economic Marxian ideology. No sooner had Israeli Foreign Minister Shim'on Peres departed from Moscow last month than the Russian leadership welcomed Syrian Defense Minister Brigadier General Mustafa Talas who held all the principal talks with his Russian partners Wednesday and Thursday [May 23 & 24] in an atmosphere of secrecy. At the Syrian side's request, journalists were denied an official photo opportunity during Mustafa Talas' meetings with his Russian partners -- Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov, Security Council Secretary Vladimir Rushaylo, Vice Premier Ilya Klebanov, and State Duma Defense Committee Chairman Andrey Nikolayev. The reason for the secrecy is that the conversations touched on very delicate issues of resuming the full-scale military-technical cooperation between the two countries that was suspended in the early 1990s but has gradually begun to return to life over the last two years. According to information received by western intelligence sources, the Syrians are ready to pay up to $1 billion within the next few years for repairs to existing military equipment and the purchase of new military equipment. Syrian/Russian cooperation was suspended primarily for international policy reasons A peace process was gaining momentum in the Near East, and its cosponsors -- the United States and Russia -- agreed not to disrupt the balance of forces between their "clients" -- Israel and the Arab countries -- that had taken shape by that time. Syria, who took part in the 1991 war (Desert Storm) against Iraq on the side of the international coalition, began to develop relations with the United States and European countries and partially "froze" its contacts with Russia. At the end of the 1990s the situation had changed. The Syrians never signed a peace treaty with Israel, and their weapons arsenal (90-percent Soviet manufactured) was becoming outdated. That was the major focus of the discussions in Moscow, the question of repairing and upgrading existing weapons. Under discussion were about 4,000 tanks, including T-72s, and over 500 warplanes (mainly MiG-21s, MiG-23s, and about two dozen MiG-29s). Russia guaranteed a full program of cooperation in this area. Another delicate issue the Syrians persistently raise is the sale of Russian S-300 air defense systems to Damascus. These systems can potentially change the entire military-strategic situation in the potentially explosive Middle East and clearly upset Tel Aviv. Major western capitals were aware of the dangers and repercussions of Israel's P.M. Sharon's refusal to submit to Syria's hard line and illegal occupation of Lebanon and understood Syria's refusal to hold negotiations with this Israeli government as the result of Syria's hardliners. As to Israel's responses, they were not entirely new and were characterized by a serious development while the Syrian president was in Sharm al-Shaykh. The report said that this development that heightened the concern in Damascus was the tone Israeli Defense Minister Binyamin Ben-Eli'ezer used by revealing publicly what was decided during the recent meeting of the inner Israeli cabinet's decision of holding Syria responsible for events emanating from Lebanon. Israel's position reinforced warnings previously conveyed to Damascus threatening that not only would Israel attack and destroy the Syrian positions in Lebanon but also would threaten the new Syrian regime. Major elements in the Lebanon diaspora in exile are now preparing to return home as well as Syrian forces also in exile. It can be safely assumed that a new Syrian government will be established along with the "old guard's" support for a major upheaval. Israel's position reinforces warnings previously conveyed to Beirut and Damascus threatening that not only would Israel attack Lebanon and destroy the Syrian positions in Lebanon but also would threaten the new Syrian regime. |
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