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Iran's Race for Regional Supremacy
Lt.-Gen. (ret.) Moshe Yaalon
Hizbullah has placed hundreds of
rocket installations south of the
Litani River, under heavy civilian
cover in Shiite villages and rural
areas
Since the 2006 war, Hizbullah’s freedom of
movement in Southern Lebanon has been limited
by the presence of nearly 14,000 UNIFIL troops
and at least 10,000 Lebanese government forces.
However, Hizbullah has still managed to place
hundreds of rocket installations south of the Litani
River, under heavy civilian cover in Shiite villages
and rural areas. In a tacit agreement with Hizbullah,
UNIFIL and Lebanese troops have avoided
operating in many areas in Southern Lebanon . On
occasion, the Lebanese army and UNIFIL have even
coordinated their actions with Hizbullah.5 In short,
the Lebanese army and UNIFIL have not enforced
the security measures stipulated by UN Security
Council Resolution 1701.6
Under Iran ’s auspices, it is little surprise that
Hizbullah and Syria have continued their political
subversion of Lebanon . Hizbullah boycotted the
Lebanese parliament in 2007 in order to topple
the pro-Western prime minister, Fouad Seniora.
Hizbullah also works to facilitate Syria ’s hold over
Lebanon, having prevented the election of a pro-
Western president on at least 19 occasions as of
May 13, 2008.7 In short, Hizbullah has continued
expending a great deal of energy to transform
Lebanon into a tightly woven piece of Iran ’s
regional revolutionary fabric.
Lebanon was also the battleground for the activities
of the radical Sunni Islamic group Fatah al-Islam,
which is an al-Qaeda affiliate backed by Syria and
Iran. Fatah al-Islam’s bloody battles in 2007 against
Lebanese security forces in and around Palestinian
refugee camps illustrate the growing complicity
of Sunni and Shiite groups in destabilizing pro-
Western governments, whether in Lebanon ,
Jordan, Egypt , or against Western-oriented leaders
of the Palestinian Authority.
In June 2007, Hamas’ violent takeover of Gaza
transformed the Strip into the region’s first “Islamic
Arab Emirate.” This was an important achievement
for Iran . It is also the region’s first example of the
Muslim Brotherhood’s governmental control of a
contiguous territory and its population. Iran ’s direct
backing of Hamas via Khaled Mashaal and the
Damascus-based Hamas leadership has essentially
transformed Gaza into a base from which to export
Iranian terror against Israel and expand Teheran’s
political control in the region. Iran now has an
additional gateway, aside from Syria and Lebanon ,
to the Arab world – and one that poses a threat to
Israel’s Arab neighbors, Egypt and Jordan .
The establishment of “Hamastan” in Gaza also
radiates victory to the jihadists of many stripes,
including those fighting the U.S.-led coalitions in
Afghanistan and Iraq . More importantly, Hamastan
has also signaled the weakness of the West’s
political will in confronting and defeating Iran and
its proxies militarily.
Iran remains one of the major destabilizing
influences in Iraq and has continued, through its
Qods Force operatives, to train, arm, and fund Iraqi
Shiite militias,8 despite the U.S. capture of several
senior members of the Qods Force in early 2007.
The U.S. Coalition Forces Commander in Iraq ,
General David Petraeus, has noted in subsequent
congressional testimony that, “it is increasingly
apparent to both coalition and Iraqi leaders that
Iran, through the use of the Qods Force, seeks to
turn the Iraqi Special Groups into a Hizbullah-like
force to serve its interests and fight a proxy war
against the Iraqi state and coalition forces in Iraq .”9
Iran’s Nuclear Program
Perhaps the most vital component of Iran ’s race for
regional supremacy is the regime’s fast-developing
nuclear weapons program, which has continued
despite international diplomatic and economic
antagonism. Unfortunately, the publication in
November 2007 of the U.S. National Intelligence
Estimate sent a misleading and even contradictory
message on the state of Iran ’s nuclear weapons
program. The report’s opening sentence – “We
judge with high confidence that in fall 2003,
Teheran halted its nuclear weapons program” –
appeared to vindicate Iranian denials.10
However, one of the report’s primary conclusions
is that Iran has continued to enrich uranium at an
accelerated pace. And there is no debate in U.S. or
Western circles over the fact that enriched uranium
is equally necessary for both civilian and military
nuclear programs. As former UN Ambassador John
Bolton has suggested, the distinction between
Iran’s “military” and “civilian” programs is highly
artificial.11
Therefore, the NIE does not attest to a cessation
of Teheran’s military nuclear program; rather,
the report provided Iran immediate relief from
international pressure while helping Ahmadinejad
calm dissent within the regime, if only temporarily.
The NIE has also lowered the prospect of U.S.-led
military action against Iranian nuclear facilities.
As a result of the Arab establishment’s concern
that the NIE represented a clear example of U.S.
hesitation to confront the Iranian regime, the Gulf
Cooperation Council, an alliance of Gulf states
established 27 years ago to counter Iran , seems
to have collapsed.12 This was illustrated sharply
when Qatar , shortly after the NIE’s release and
without consulting its fellow Gulf members, invited
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to deliver the keynote
address at the 2008 GCC summit in Doha .
It was no coincidence that Ahmadinejad was invited
to address the GCC on the eve of President George
W. Bush’s January 2008 Middle East visit. This was
an example of the Sunni establishment signaling
the U.S. that it was keeping its options open – that
it was beginning to view Iran as the winning horse.
Al-Qaeda and its Affiliates
Sunni jihadi organizations linked to al-Qaeda
refocused some of their activity during 2007 closer
to Israel ’s borders with Syria , Lebanon , and Gaza.13
During President Bush’s January 2008 visit to Israel ,
al-Qaeda affiliates launched a 107mm rocket from
Southern Lebanon at the northern Israeli town of
Shlomi.14 In June 2007, Fatah al-Islam, an al-Qaeda
offshoot based in Lebanon , fired rockets at the
northern Israeli town of Kiryat Shmona , hitting the
city’s industrial zone.15
The establishment of “Hamastan”
in Gaza also radiates victory to the
jihadists of many stripes, including
those fighting the U.S.-led coalitions
in Afghanistan and Iraq .
To Israel ’s south, Hamas’ strategically planned
destruction of the Gaza-Egypt border fence in
January 2008 enabled jihadi groups such as al-
Qaeda, which have already used Egyptian Sinai as
a rear base, to reach Gaza more easily. Al-Qaedaaffiliated
operatives, some of whom infiltrated
from Egypt , Sudan , and Yemen , have been active
in Gaza since 2006.
Over the past several years, al-Qaeda-affiliated
organizations have also emerged in Gaza , including
Jaish al-Islam (Army of Islam), which was responsible
for the kidnapping of BBC journalist Alan Johnston.
Other jihadi groups were also formed, such as
Jaish al-Umma (Army of the Nation), Al-Qaeda
in Palestine , and Mujahidin Beit al-Makdes (Holy
Warriors of Jerusalem ), which attacked the American
International School in Gaza in January 2008.16
Iran and the Palestinian Authority
Hamas’ takeover of the Gaza Strip was one of the most
significant regional developments of 2007. Gaza is
now the first Islamic Arab emirate in the Middle East ,
and represents a likely irrevocable victory of Islamists
over the Palestinian and Arab nationalists.
Both Egypt and the Palestinian Authority reportedly
pointed to Iran ’s major role in the Hamas takeover
of Gaza . According to Tawfik Tirawi, head of PA
intelligence, the Hamas takeover in Gaza “was
coordinated with Iran which provided training
and weapons and was informed of every step.”17
Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmed Abu Gheit
charged that Iran ’s intervention in Gaza and Iraq
threatened Egypt ’s national security.18
Notwithstanding Gaza ’s transformation into a
de facto sovereign Hamas state, Gaza ’s status
as an Islamist platform began after Israel ’s 2005
disengagement from Gaza . Between 2005 and
late 2007, some 230 tons of explosives, including
scores of anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles, were
smuggled into Gaza via underground tunnels
from Egyptian Sinai into Gaza.19 Since January
2007 alone, more than 3,000 Palestinian rockets
and mortars have been fired at Israel by Iraniansponsored
groups.20
Since Hamas’ breach of the Gaza-Egypt border in
January 2008, tons of additional explosives have
been transferred overland from Egypt to Gaza.21
The breach also enabled Hamas to bring back
operatives who had left Gaza for training in Syria
and Iran , including snipers, explosives experts,
rocket experts, and engineers.22 In March 2008,
Hamas officials admitted for the first time that
hundreds of their top operatives have trained in
Syria and Iran under the aegis of Iran ’s Revolutionary
Guards Corps (IRGC). Hamas officials noted that
Iran’s training of Hamas is similar to Iran ’s training
of Hizbullah.23
Massive Iranian financial support continued to
flow into Hamas coffers in 2007, reaching between
$120 and $200 million.24 In December 2007 alone,
some $100 million was smuggled into Gaza by
senior Hamas members returning from the annual
haj pilgrimage to Saudi Arabia . Hundreds of
millions of dollars have since likely crossed Gaza ’s
broken border.25
In March 2008, Hamas officials admitted
for the first time that hundreds
of their top operatives have
trained in Syria and Iran under
the aegis of Iran ’s Revolutionary
Guards Corps (IRGC). Hamas officials
noted that Iran ’s training of
Hamas is similar to Iran ’s training
of Hizbullah.
For its part, Hamas could likely take control of the
West Bank, or at least create major disturbances,
if the IDF security presence there was significantly
relaxed or removed. One important conclusion is
that the Palestinian Authority under the leadership
of Mahmoud Abbas lacks the ability, political will, or
both to create a secure, accountable entity in Gaza
and the West Bank governed by the rule of law.
While Hamas influence in the West Bank is
widespread and growing, Iran has used money,
ideology, and training to help influence other
Palestinian terror groups in the West Bank , such
as the Al Aksa Martyrs’ Brigades and Palestinian
Islamic Jihad, despite the fact that they too are
Sunni and not Shiite groups.
Syria
Syria has continued to call for peace negotiations
with Israel as a tactic ostensibly aimed at regaining
the Golan Heights . However, Damascus ’ real agenda
is to ease international pressure on the regime. At
the same time, Syria and Iran have deepened their
strategic cooperation,26 while Syria has continued
its policy of destabilizing the region via:
Dispatching thousands of mujahadin from Syria
to Iraq.27
Arming Hizbullah in Lebanon in violation of UN
Security Council Resolutions 1559 and 1701.
Training and hosting Palestinian terror groups
and Iranian Qods Force operatives in Damascus .
Assassinating Lebanese political leaders,
journalists, and opponents and directly
interfering in Lebanon ’s political process in an
effort to restore Syrian control.
In an egregious violation of the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty, building a nuclear reactor
with North Korean help.
Strengthening its political, security, and
economic alliance with Iran .
Upgrading its arsenal of surface-to-surface
missiles, chemical weapons, and the doubling of
its rocket inventory compared to 2006.28
In view of these developments in Syria , the policies
of United States , the Western alliance, and Israel are
problematic and require urgent review.
Iran and the Western Alliance
The failure of the U.S.-led Western alliance to
isolate Iran diplomatically and economically and
the failure to make Iran pay a price for specific
acts of aggression have emboldened the regime
throughout the Middle East .
For example, Iran ’s successful “probes” of
both Britain and the United States in separate
confrontations in the Persian Gulf sent a clear
message about the West’s continued reluctance to
confront the Iranian regime. In March 2007, Qods
Force naval operatives kidnapped 15 British naval
personnel and held them for nearly two weeks
before releasing them “as a gift of the Iranians.” In
January and April 2008, IRGC speedboats charged
U.S. naval warships in the Strait of Hormuz , nearly
triggering armed confrontations. In these instances,
neither British nor U.S. forces responded militarily
to the direct provocations by the Iranians.
The Palestinian Authority , Israel ,
and the Western Alliance
The November 2007 Annapolis peace “meeting,” the
subsequent Paris Donor Conference, and President
George W. Bush’s follow-up visit to Jerusalem and
Ramallah all reflect the strategic inertia of U.S. ,
European, and some Israeli policymakers when
it comes to the essence of the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict and the inability to create better strategies
to address the deep-rooted crisis – and to address
the ways it has changed in recent years.
Moshe Yaalon
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The U.S.-led effort insists on first solving the Israeli-
Palestinian territorial dispute, which is still seen as
a primary cause of the region’s problems, rather
than as a symptom of the actual cause – Islamic
rejection of Israel . The takeover of Gaza by Iran ’s
Hamas proxy and the manner in which Hamas set
about attacking Israel should be all the evidence
anyone needs that the conflict is “not over the size
of the state of Israel , but rather its actual existence,”
as Bernard Lewis noted in a Wall Street Journal oped
the day before the Annapolis conference.29
The U.S.-led effort insists on first
solving the Israeli-Palestinian territorial
dispute, which is still seen
as a primary cause of the region’s
problems, rather than as a symptom
of the actual cause – Islamic
rejection of Israel .
A senior PA negotiator further clarified the
existential nature of the conflict in the days leading
up to Annapolis when he publicly refused to affirm
that the State of Israel had the right to exist as a
Jewish state.30 However, international expectations
of a Palestinian state in Gaza and the West Bank
have continued unabated; for example, Israel has
not been able to disconnect itself from Gaza due
in large part to international expectations and
pressure on Israel to continue to supply the territory
with electricity, water, and commercial goods.
But Hamas’ breach of the Gaza-Egypt border
n January 23, 2008, created a new possibility.31
Egypt has demonstrated its ability to play a direct
role in supplying materials, goods, and services
to Gaza , thereby enabling Israel to complete its
disengagement. However, unceasing efforts by
both Western and Arab governments to break the
international boycott on Gaza either by supporting
a Fatah-Hamas unity government or by calling for
cease-fire talks has placed Israel in a political and
diplomatic bind – forcing it to remain committed
to the diplomatic framework of a single Palestinian
state in Gaza and the West Bank .
In order to avoid the same mistakes in the future, it is
crucial that the Western alliance fully assimilate the
dramatic lessons of Israel ’s 2005 disengagement
from Gaza .
The failed experiment of the Gaza disengagement
has tremendous implications for the future of the
West Bank, particularly the Jordan Rift Valley and the
hills overlooking the greater Tel Aviv area and Ben-
Gurion Airport. These areas are essential to Israel ’s
security, yet Israel will be expected to withdraw
from them completely in the context of a bilateral
agreement with the Palestinians. The West Bank
hills overlooking the coastal plain provide an ideal
launching area for Palestinian rocket and mortar
attacks against Israel ’s main population centers,
roads, and national infrastructure, including Ben-
Gurion Airport.
Aside from the current prohibitive strategic
environment for a bilateral peace process, the
Annapolis and Paris conferences have continued to
emphasize the tactic of injecting billions of dollars
in economic aid into Palestinian Authority coffers
as a central tool for conflict resolution. For their
part, Mahmoud Abbas and PA Prime Minister Salam
Fayad reportedly intend to assign close to half of the
$8 billion pledged at the Paris donors conference
as direct economic assistance to Gaza.32
In effect, more than $3 billion in Western financial
support for the Palestinians will end up in Hamas
hands, strengthening their control of Gaza instead
of weakening them and forcing them to pay a
price for their 2007 coup and the ongoing violence
that Hamas provokes. The Annapolis and Paris
conferences’ approach to peacemaking also seems
to overlook the fact that more than $7 billion was
lavished on the PA during the Oslo years from 1993
to 2006. That money was largely wasted or used
for terrorism, while up to $2 billion is suspected of
having been pilfered by Yasser Arafat.
Despite these past failures and the current absence
of Palestinian security, economic, and political
reforms, not to mention the continued presence
of incessant Islamic incitement against Israel ’s
existence in Palestinian media, school books, and
universities, and in PA-sponsored mosque sermons,
the West has continued to provide the Palestinian
Authority with massive economic, security, and
political support.
President Bush seems to understand the stakes
in the new Middle East, especially the manner
in which so many sources of destabilization and
violence today have a return address in Teheran.
During his January 2008 visit to the UAE and Saudi
Arabia, Bush said that Iran “undermines Lebanese
hopes for peace by arming and aiding the terrorist
group Hizbullah. It subverts the hopes for peace
in other parts of the region by funding terrorist
groups like Hamas and Palestine Islamic Jihad. It
sends arms to the Taliban in Afghanistan and Shiite
militias in Iraq . It intimidates its neighbors with
ballistic missiles...and it defies the United Nations
and destabilizes the region by refusing to be open
and transparent about its nuclear programs and
Foreword
13
ambitions. Iran ’s actions threaten the security of
nations everywhere.”
Clearly, Bush’s security commitment to Saudi Arabia
and the Gulf emirates is equally relevant to the
State of Israel . A deep Israeli territorial withdrawal
today or in the foreseeable future would only
intensify Israel ’s strategic vulnerabilities to Iraniansponsored
terror groups and al-Qaeda. Thus, the
current conceptual approach to peacemaking, that
began at Oslo in 1993, was “reframed” in the 2002
Road Map, and then “crowned” at the Annapolis
and Paris conferences in 2007, should now be
tabled. Instead, a regional approach to Middle East
security, diplomacy, and peacemaking should be
pursued, based on the economic and diplomatic
isolation of Iran and, if necessary, military action.
The West Bank hills overlooking
the coastal plain provide an ideal
launching area for Palestinian
rocket and mortar attacks against
Israel’s main population centers,
roads, and national infrastructure,
including Ben-Gurion Airport .
Hamas control of Gaza has moved Egypt to consider
playing a much larger role in helping to influence
Gaza’s future, while the Hashemite Kingdom of
Jordan may, under certain conditions, increase its
assistance to Abbas and other “moderate” leaders in
order to secure the West Bank from being overtaken
by jihadi groups, local warlords, and armed militias.
Only then, with the Iranian regime neutralized and
the Palestinian areas stabilized with the help of its
neighbors, can Palestinian institution-building be
advanced via verifiable Palestinian reforms in the
security, economic, educational, and political realms.
This two-stage approach will enable the Palestinians
to build a secure, free, democratic society from the
ground up, instead of the current inverted “top down”
approach. Just as important, a new regional approach
to Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking must also include
the direct and open participation of the Palestinians’
and Israel ’s Egyptian and Jordanian neighbors.
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