|
When a Nation Loses its Wisdom
by Israel Harel
Haaretz
This week the three kidnapped soldiers - rather than the political crisis that stems from the ethical crisis and that is about to shake up the entire structure of Israel's government
- were at the center of public discussion, and therefore of public interest.
The words of Moshe Ya'alon, to the effect that we should not pay an exaggerated price for captives even if there is fear for their lives,
aroused some positive though mostly negative reactions. But they were far stronger than the reaction to the Labor Party's decision - which is of utmost political importance - to vote in favor of disbanding the Knesset.
One of the main reasons why Ehud Olmert embarked on the Second Lebanon War was to prove to Hezbollah and the other terror organizations that the era of Israel's acceptance of the kidnapping of soldiers and civilians, and
payment of an unacceptable price for their return, was over. He also wanted to restore Israel's power of deterrence, and to prove that there is no truth to the famous statement by Hassan Nasrallah to the effect that Israel's
tolerance for suffering is like a spiderweb, or that its end, according to the prophecy of Palestinian intellectuals, will be like that of the Crusaders, due to imminent polarization and demonstrations of weakness. The IDF and
civil society did not pass the test of determination and did not give the political echelon - first in Lebanon and later vis-a-vis Hamas - the achievement that would have made it possible to prove to the enemy that Israeli
society is in fact strong in body and soul, and that their attacks are no more than insect bites that the Israelis will easily withstand.
Even worse: The outcome of the war, both on the battlefield and on the home front,
only strengthened the enemy's basic assumptions. The behavior of the home front in many places - Safed being the prominent example - testified to an almost total absence of will to confront a crisis situation that caused
minuscule damage in terms of lives and property, when compared with the suffering of other nations during wars.
In the war of the Qassams, for example, a negligible number of losses has led to a significant movement of
abandonment, including in kibbutzim that in the past set an example when it came to the fortitude of their residents. Things have come so far that even the IDF is evacuating a major training base out of the range of the
rockets; it is joining this pattern of behavior - which will boost the enemy's morale and propaganda machine.
This behavior of the army and civilians - in other words, the nation - apparently explains why the government
agreed to the absurd cease-fire with Hamas, and without Gilad Shalit. And those who are trying to destroy us can once again say to themselves: All our basic assumptions regarding Israel's fragility, in spite of their attempt to
prove otherwise, are true and proven.
The Israeli home front cannot withstand a prolonged war effort; even when withstanding it does not involve significant losses. Israel does not dare to endanger the lives of its
soldiers in order to fight to end this situation, even if failure to do so undermines its sovereignty and the citizens' confidence in their government. Israel is therefore accepting the dictate of Hamas regarding the conditions
for the cease-fire - first and foremost the failure to include Gilad Shalit. He will be released in return for hundreds of terrorists, and Israel will be humiliated and forced to return to a pattern of behavior that it promised
never to adopt again.
And if it has done so in the South, why not vis-a-vis Hezbollah as well? After all, the prime minister boasted to Nasrallah that the kidnapping of Eldad Regev and Ehud Goldwasser was one kidnapping
too many. But with such demonstrations of fortitude on the part of both the government and the citizens, is it any wonder that on the verge of completing the deal, Nasrallah added Palestinian terrorists to the list of those to
be released?
The affair of the cease-fire (with firing that has not ceased) with Hamas, and the affair of the overly generous concessions to Hezbollah - and almost certainly only in return for dead bodies - would not
have taken place had it not been for the worrisome connection between a civilian public that lacks tolerance for suffering, and a government whose only goal is survival. And thus the citizens and the government are postponing
the inevitable, in other words, mortgaging the future. After all, it is clear to everyone that the enemy that will become stronger will wage a far more bitter and difficult war against those who desire a lull now.
It
would make some sense if in return for strategic, moral and political folly in the North and South we would at least receive Shalit, Regev and Goldwasser alive and well. But to sow the seeds of the next kidnappings - and at an
exorbitant price - is intolerable folly and loss of wisdom.
|
