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Emerging Crisis in Pakistan-U.S. Relations
By: Tufail Ahmad
Introduction
A series of policies devised by the new civilian government of Pakistani Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani has set the U.S. and Pakistan on a collision course,
threatening to undo the achievements so far in the War on Terror.
This turn in Pakistan-U.S. relations has wider implications for the War on Terror, especially in Afghanistan, where the newborn democracy is yet to stand
on its feet. The origins of this rift in Pakistan-U.S. relations lie in the nature of the regimes in Islamabad before and after the February 2008 elections - namely, the military-led government under Gen. President Pervez
Musharraf and the subsequent civilian government of Yousuf Raza Gilani. Gen. Musharraf took the reins of power in a coup in 1999 by toppling the government of elected Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. He was later backed by the
Pakistan Muslim League (Q), a political party formed by dissidents from Nawaz Sharif's party.
While all governments in Islamabad had supported the Taliban in Afghanistan, following 9/11 Pakistan was forced to abandon the
Taliban and support the U.S., becoming a key U.S. ally in its fight against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. However, with a new government in power, this policy is undergoing a radical change.
The February 18 elections
witnessed the rise of political parties that won because of their public opposition to Gen. Musharraf's continuance in power, and especially for his support to the War on Terror and his illegal holding of two posts
simultaneously - army commander in chief and president. Gen. Musharraf was so scared of the legal challenges to his holding of both these posts that he fired most of the higher judiciary. However, mass opposition became so
strong that Musharraf was forced to abandon the post of army commander in chief - but only after he engineered his victory for another term as president last November. [1]
The February polls decimated the Pakistan Muslim
League (Q) that had supported the president. Major opposition groups such as Benazir Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party, Nawaz Sharif's Pakistan Muslim League (N) and the Pashtun nationalist Awami National Party emerged
victorious. [2] The three parties are now dictating Pakistan's policies, in line with their election's pledge to eliminate the U.S. role in Pakistan's internal affairs. This is creating a gulf in Pakistan-U.S. relations. This
gulf deepened on May 14, 2008 when a pilotless U.S. drone fired missiles at the house of a Taliban commander in Pakistan's tribal district of Bajaur Agency. [3]
The Damadola Attack and the New Criticism of U.S.
On
May 15, 2008, Pakistan's mass-circulation Urdu-language newspaper Roznama Jang carried two contrasting news stories that reflect how Pakistani policies are moving on a course different from what the U.S. is accustomed to expect
from its key ally. The first story was of the killing, by a U.S. drone, of more than a dozen Taliban militants and the destruction of another house that served as Taliban's arms depot in Damadola (Bajaur Agency) [4], and the
second was of the release of 30 militants by the Gilani government in exchange for the freedom of 55 soldiers, under a peace deal with the Pakistani Taliban in the federally administered tribal district of South Waziristan.
Also under the deal, the civilian government withdrew Pakistani security forces from the streets to their barracks. [5]
The U.S., and in fact most of the international community, does not want the Pakistani government to
make peace deals with the Taliban, as it often involves yielding control to the Taliban and releasing militants who are then free to cross the border to Afghanistan and to fight U.S. and NATO troops. At the same time, the new
regime in Islamabad does not want the U.S. to interfere in any way in the country's internal affairs.
The Damadola attack fuelled mass anger in Pakistan against the U.S., with people and politicians criticizing it as an
attack on Pakistan's sovereignty. There was nothing new in the attack itself. There have been missile attacks on militants' meetings in Damadola in January and October 2006, and even after that the U.S. and NATO soldiers
deployed in Afghanistan maintained vigilance in their reaction to the Taliban activities inside Pakistani border areas.
On past occasions, the Pakistani policy had been to ignore such attacks from an important and
powerful ally. The government, led by Gen. Musharraf, at best protested the loss of innocent lives. Now with the change in the regime in Islamabad, with the control of power shifting from Gen. (now retired) President Musharraf
to the civilian Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani, the reaction was different.
However, change often brings confusion. After the May 14, 2008 attack, Pakistan's foreign office was initially in confusion, perhaps due to a
sense of realpolitik, as to whether to continue with the traditional policy of not criticizing such attacks. In its first reaction, the foreign office said it was not aware of any such attack. [6] However, there was a new
government and new popular expectation from it. Prime Minister Gilani took upon himself to strongly criticize the attack on Damadola in Bajaur Agency, stating: "Pakistan condemns the Bajaur attack. Not every policy of the
U.S. is practical, nor [we] can act upon it." [7]
The Nature of the New Regime in Pakistan
Notwithstanding statements by Prime Minister Gilani about 'impractical' U.S. polices, Pakistan has been a strong ally
of the U.S. for the past six decades. Under the leadership of President Musharraf, Pakistan has indeed provided practical help to the U.S. in hunting down Taliban and Al-Qaeda militants after 9/11. Gilani's statement was meant
not only to condemn the Damadola attack but also to indicate that Pakistan would not accept every U.S. demand.
This change in Pakistani policy is rooted in the nature of the new regime in Islamabad. On March 29, 2008,
Yousuf Raza Gilani became the first Prime Minister to obtain the vote of trust by all political parties including those in opposition. Soon after the vote, Gilani announced a series of programs for his government's first 100
days. In his address to parliament, the prime minister signalled his government's intention to reverse the Musharraf-era policy of confronting the Taliban. He said: "Terrorism has put the nation in danger. Ending terrorism
will be our first priority. Some people have taken to the path of violence; they should abandon the path of violence. We are ready for talks with these forces [Taliban]." [8]
The policy of engaging the Taliban is
rooted in a belief that the bomb blasts and suicide attacks that literally destabilized Pakistan in recent years can be stopped through dialogue with the militants. This belief is shared by the major parties of the ruling
alliance: the Pakistan People's Party, the Pakistan Muslim League (N) and the Awami National Party. The latter has also formed the provincial government in Pakistan's North West Frontier Province (NWFP).
The U.S. and
Afghanistan have opposed the new Pakistani policy of engaging the Taliban, saying that instead of eliminating extremism the new Gilani government is actually strengthening the militants in Pakistan's tribal districts. However,
the governments in Islamabad and North West Frontier Province have gone ahead with negotiations with the Taliban. As a result, several top Taliban leaders and hundreds of militants have been released from Pakistani prisons,
among them Islamist leader Maulana Sufi Muhammad. The Gilani government has also agreed to establish shari'a rule in the border region, as desired by the Taliban. [9]
While these deals buy temporary peace for Pakistan,
the U.S. and Afghanistan are deeply worried, fearing that the Taliban will become stronger in the process. If the Taliban became stronger, the traditional Pakistani policy of controlling Afghanistan through the Taliban may
emerge again.
Pakistani Taliban Involved in Fighting in Afghanistan
The U.S. concern over Pakistan's new policy of dialogue was articulated at the highest level by the White House. President George W. Bush said
that if there was another 9/11-like attack on the U.S., the planning for such an attack would take place in Pakistan's tribal areas. [10]
Afghanistan has also argued that the Pakistani deal with the Taliban leaves
Afghanistan's new democracy vulnerable to Islamist takeover. It has even asked Pakistan to give it a list of Taliban leaders released under the peace deal. [11] Afghanistan has expressed concern that the assassination attempt
on Afghan President Hamid Karzai last April was planned in Pakistan's tribal districts. [12] President Karzai has repeatedly stated that the deals with the Taliban are increasing threats to Afghanistan, as under these deals the
Taliban are not prevented from crossing into Afghanistan.
In an editorial, the Peshawar-based Urdu-language newspaper Roznama Mashriq articulated the Pakistani standpoint: "The U.S. and NATO forces deployed in
Afghanistan and the Afghan president are criticizing the peace deals. There is no justification for their criticism; nor do they have a right to interfere in Pakistan's internal affairs in such a way that it would impinge on
Pakistan's independent and sovereign status." [13]
However, the U.S., NATO and Afghan concerns about Pakistani government's deals with the Taliban are turning out to be true. This was evident when the bodies of
Pakistani Taliban fighters arrived from Afghanistan to Pakistan last May. [14] This was a clear case that the Pakistani Taliban are going to Afghanistan to fight the U.S. and NATO troops there.
U.S.'s Strategy and the Role of the Pakistan Army
The U.S.'s strategy is focused on two fronts: first, to continue to ensure that beleaguered General (R) President Musharraf remains in power as long as it is tenable or
an alternative emerges. Second, to convince the Gilani government to understand the wider implications of deals with the Taliban and stop them sooner rather than later. President Musharraf still has the power to fire parliament
should the civilian government take its confront-Musharraf policy to its logical end and impeach him. There is speculation as to whether Pakistan Army Chief Gen. Ashfaq Kiyani will support Musharraf in such an eventuality.
The Pakistani army has maintained distance from the civilian government's negotiations with the Taliban. There are three points on which the civilian government has pursued a policy different from that of the Musharraf
regime: Taliban militants captured by the army are released in exchange for hundreds of its soldiers taken captive by the Taliban; secessionist fighters captured during military operations in the province of Baluchistan are
being freed in the name of national reconciliation; and the civilian government has sent the case of the assassination of former prime minister Benazir Bhutto to be investigated by the U.N. - a move that some army generals fear
may reveal inside information to non-Pakistani investigators. [15]
The U.S. hopes that the Pakistani army, which has received about US $10 billion in aid since 9/11, will toe the U.S. line and support former army man
Musharraf. However, the army has lost respect in the eyes of people, and might not wish to go against the civilian government. Its policy for now has been to wait and watch. In response to U.S. concerns over the
government-Taliban deals, an army spokesman said: "The objective of the military operations in the tribal districts was to restore the government's writ and law and order. We have brought the situations to a point where
political process may begin." [16]
In order to impress upon the army that it still needs the U.S., the Pentagon has, for now, turned down a request from the Pakistan army for more funds to fight the militants,
saying that previous such aid has not prevented Taliban and Al-Qaeda from creating safe havens in Pakistan's tribal areas. [17] In the last week of May, Pakistan was awash with rumors that President Musharraf was about to
resign, ostensibly under the heavy barrage of mass criticism. There were rumours that a Turkish plane was waiting at the airport and his baggage was being readied. In a sign of how important it is to the U.S. that Musharraf not
be lost from the scene, President Bush phoned Musharraf, assuring him of his support and expressing his hope that Musharraf would continue to play a role in U.S.-Pakistan relations. [18] This phone call laid all the rumors to
rest.
On the other hand, the U.S. is also keeping up pressure on the civilian government. A number of U.S. military and government officials have visited Pakistan in recent months. They held meetings with military
officials as well as political leaders of all Pakistani parties to convince them of their viewpoint. In the first week of May, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Richard Boucher directly mediated in the London talks between Asif
Zardari and Nawaz Sharif, leaders of the two largest parties in the ruling coalition. The mediation was aimed at convincing Nawaz Sharif not to insist on restoring deposed Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry as part of the
package for restoration of judges fired last November by President Musharraf. [19] The U.S. strategy here again is to help the beleaguered Pakistani president.
In the third week of May, the U.S. brought highest-level
pressure on the civilian government. President Bush met with Prime Minister Gilani in the Egyptian resort town of Sharm Al-Sheikh. Following the hour-long meeting, Bush and Gilani pledged to work for long-term strategic
relations between U.S. and Pakistan. But according to one media report, no progress was made with regard to the future of a likely joint strategy in the War on Terror. [20] For now, the U.S. is left with supporting President
Musharraf, and with hoping that the Pakistani army will support him in the event that a crisis erupts. The search is continuing for a breakthrough in Pakistan-U.S. relations but it is turning out to be bitter and bloody.
For a while, it appeared that the U.S. diplomacy was turning out to be effective in convincing the civilian leadership in Islamabad that the deals with the Taliban are not the right way to go forward. This could be seen in the
emergence of divergent opinions in the Pakistani establishment over the deals.
For example, Rahman Malik, the adviser for homeland security to the Pakistani Prime Minister, told a press conference that in view of the
continuing Taliban activities a peace deal with them in the Swat district of North West Frontier Province has ended. [21] This surprised the NWFP government, which reacted by saying that the federal government could not end the
deal as it was signed by the province. In another illustration of how the Pakistani government may have been sensitive to U.S. concerns over the Taliban deals, Pakistan's Defense Minister Ahmed Mukhtar said that the Damadola
attack may have been accidental. [22] He has also introduced a sophisticated strand in public discussion on the deals by arguing that the government is engaging the local tribes, such as the Mehsud tribe in the tribal district
of South Waziristan, and not 'outsiders' like Al-Qaeda. [23] However, the groups aligned under the banner of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (the Movement of Pakistani Taliban) are very often organized on tribal lines, which makes
this effort ineffective.
In the search for a breakthrough in Pakistan-U.S. relations, two incidents that occurred in mid-June need elaboration. The first of these was a U.S. bombing in the tribal district of Mohmand
Agency on June 11 which killed more than a dozen Pakistani soldiers, including a major, as well as civilians. [24] For the people in Pakistan who were yet to forget the Damadola attack, this attack inflamed sentiments against
the United States. Second, just a few days after the attack in Mohmand Agency, motorcycle-borne Taliban fighters stormed the main jail in the southern Afghan city of Kandahar and freed hundreds of Taliban. [25] The daring
nature of the Taliban attack has a recent parallel in an assassination attempt last April against Afghan President Hamid Karzai, right in the middle of a military parade in Kabul. Afghanistan said at the time that the plot was
hatched in Pakistan's tribal areas.
U.S. and NATO troops are fighting against the Taliban in Afghanistan. However, the Taliban have their nursery in Pakistan's tribal districts. After the Kandahar jailbreak, President
Hamid Karzai made his strongest statement yet against the continuance of the Taliban's safe havens in Pakistan, warning that Afghan troops would cross into Pakistan in pursuit of the Taliban because Afghanistan is a victim of
the terrorism being perpetrated from across the border in Pakistani tribal districts. Karzai reminded the Pakistani leadership of the statements issued by the leaders of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan's Baitullah Mehsud, Maulana
Fazlullah and Maulvi Omar, in which they had said they would cross into Afghanistan. [26]
For now, Pakistani Defense Minister Ahmed Mukhtar has condemned the U.S. attack that killed the Pakistani soldiers. However, he
has also said that if Pakistan is to live with the international community, it will have to participate in the war against terror. [27] The days ahead will tell if Mukhtar's statements are the voice of a pragmatic loner, or
that of Pakistan's civilian leadership. In view of the Taliban's storming of the Kandahar jail just days after the attack in Mohmand Agency, one wonders whether the U.S.'s search for a breakthrough in Pakistan-U.S. relations
will materialize anytime soon.
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