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As Iran Turns Irreversibly Nuclear
Israel's Last ChanceLouis René Beres
Professor of International Law
Despite repeated and informed warnings from Washington and Jerusalem that a nuclear Iran must not be allowed, the “international community” has still done nothing to stop President
Ahmadinejad’s atomic progress. To be sure, there have been a series of much publicized “economic sanctions,” but none that has ever had even a remote chance of success. For the current regime in Tehran , the expected benefits
of going nuclear easily outweigh any conceivable costs.
International law is not a suicide pact. With its persistent refusal to make good on essential threats of preemption or anticipatory self-defense, the international
community must now bear responsible witness to the operation of 492 new centrifuges at the Natanz uranium enrichment plant. Moreover, President Ahmadinejad announced on April 8 that Iran was already working to install 6,000
additional centrifuges at the facility in central Iran . This significant announcement came on the same day that Iran marked its “National Day of Nuclear Technology” – the second anniversary of its first production of uranium
sufficiently enriched for atomic fuel.
It is very late for any effective preemption against pertinent Iranian nuclear assets and infrastructures. It is also unlikely that the Bush Administration would now display the
political will needed to undertake such an unpopular act of lawful self-defense. Naturally, operational difficulties for Israel would be much greater, and – for Jerusalem - the political and diplomatic fallout would be greater
still. Yet, to do nothing meaningful to defend oneself from an openly existential assault – to allow an expressly genocidal regime to go nuclear – would be inexcusable.
Every state’s first obligation is the assurance of
protection. Innocent life must be preserved. When Iranian leaders openly proclaim belief in the Shiite apocalypse, a series of final battles presumed indispensable for transforming the profane “world of war” into the sacred
“world of Islam,” even very extreme measures of self-defense must be considered.
Does “justice” have another face in this matter? Some would argue indignantly against any American and/or Israeli preemption on the grounds
of a presumed need for nuclear “equity.” Israel already has nuclear weapons, goes this argument. Why, then, should Iran be treated differently? International law speaks repeatedly of “sovereign equality.” Isn’t there an evident
lack of “fairness” in denying to Iran what has tacitly been allowed to Israel ?
Here is an answer. Israel ’s nuclear forces remain deliberately ambiguous and undeclared. They have never been brandished in a threatening
fashion by Israel ’s civilian or military leaders. Nor does Israel ever call for wiping any other state “off the map.” Israel ’s nuclear weapons exist only to protect the Jewish state from extraordinary forms of aggression.
Understandably, this includes the prevention of another Jewish genocide and related crimes against humanity.
Israel ’s nuclear deterrent force would never be used except in defensive reprisal for massive enemy first
strikes. In practice, this means primarily Iranian attacks involving nuclear and/or certain biological weapons. For the time being, none of Israel ’s enemies are nuclear, but this could assuredly change. If it should actually
have to face nuclear enemies one day, Israel could choose to rely upon its own nuclear weapons to reduce the risks of unconventional war, but only insofar as the newly-nuclear enemy state(s) would (1) remain rational; and (2)
remain convinced that Israel would retaliate nuclearly if attacked with nuclear and/or devastating biological weapons.
For Israel and its U.S. ally, there would be very complex problems to identify and solve if an enemy
state such as Iran were allowed to go nuclear. These problems would undermine the neat but unrealistic notion of any balanced nuclear deterrence in the region. The Middle East could not sustain the comforting equilibrium that
had once characterized U.S.-Soviet relations. Whether for reasons of miscalculation, accident, unauthorized capacity to fire, outright irrationality or the presumed imperatives of “Jihad,” an enemy state in this fevered
neighborhood could opt to launch a nuclear first-strike against Israel in spite of that country’s own obvious and secure nuclear capability. A Cold War type of “Mutual Assured Destruction” (a so-called “balance of terror”)
could not obtain in the Middle East .
After any enemy nuclear aggression, Israel would certainly respond with a nuclear retaliatory strike. Although nothing is publicly known about Israel ’s precise targeting doctrine,
such a reprisal would likely be launched against the aggressor’s capital city and/or against similarly high-value urban targets. There would be absolutely no assurances, in response to this sort of genocidal aggression, that
Israel would limit itself to striking back against exclusively military targets. For further clarifications, it would be useful to read the final report of Project Daniel, “ Israel ’s Strategic Future.”
What if enemy
first strikes were to involve “only” chemical and/or “minor” biological weapons? In this case, Israel might still launch a presumptively proportionate nuclear reprisal, but this would depend largely upon Israel ’s calculated
expectations of follow-on aggression and on its associated determinations of comparative damage-limitation. Should Israel absorb a massive conventional first-strike, a nuclear retaliation could not be ruled out. This is
plausible if: (1) the aggressor were perceived to hold nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction in reserve; and/or (2) Israel’s leaders were to believe that non-nuclear retaliations could not prevent national annihilation.
Recognizing Israel ’s small size, the calculated threshold of existential harms would be determinably lower than Israel ’s total physical devastation.
Facing imminent existential attacks, Israel could decide to preempt
enemy aggression with conventional forces. The targeted state’s response would then determine Israel ’s subsequent moves. If this response were in any way nuclear, Israel would assuredly undertake nuclear counter-retaliation.
If this enemy retaliation were to involve chemical and/or biological weapons, Israel might also plan to take a quantum escalatory initiative. This sort of initiative is known in military parlance as “escalation dominance.” It
would be necessary to Israel ’s preservation of intra-war deterrence.
If an enemy state’s response to an Israeli preemption were limited to hard-target conventional strikes, it is improbable that Israel would resort to
nuclear counter-retaliation. But if the enemy state’s conventional retaliation were an all-out strike directed toward Israel ’s civilian populations as well as to Israeli military targets, an Israeli nuclear counter-retaliation
could not be excluded. Such a counter-retaliation could be ruled out only if the enemy state’s conventional retaliations were entirely proportionate to Israel ’s preemption; confined entirely to Israeli military targets;
circumscribed by the legal limits of “military necessity”; and accompanied by explicit and verifiable assurances of no further escalation.
It is almost inconceivable that Israel would ever decide to preempt any enemy
state aggression with a nuclear defensive strike. While particular circumstances could arise where such a defensive strike would be completely rational, and also be entirely lawful according to the authoritative 1996 Advisory
Opinion of the International Court of Justice, it is unlikely that Israel would permit itself to reach such all-or-nothing circumstances. Also, Israel has long been pledged to the “purity of arms,” and to incomparably strict
compliance with humanitarian international law.
An Israeli nuclear preemption could be expected only if: (1) Israel’s enemy or enemies had unexpectedly acquired nuclear or other unconventional weapons presumed capable of
destroying the Jewish State; (2) this enemy state had been forthright that its genocidal intentions paralleled its capabilities; (3) this state was reliably believed ready to begin a final countdown-to-launch; and (4) Israel
believed that non-nuclear preemptions could not possibly achieve levels of damage-limitation consistent with its own national survival.
The primary point of Israel’s nuclear forces must always be deterrence ex ante, not
preemption or reprisal ex post. If, however, nuclear weapons should ever be introduced into a conflict between Israel and one or more of the several states that still wish to destroy it, some form of nuclear war fighting could
ensue. This would be the case so long as: (a) enemy state first-strikes against Israel would not destroy the Jewish State’s second-strike nuclear capability; (b) enemy state retaliations for Israeli conventional preemption
would not destroy Israel’s nuclear counter-retaliatory capability; (c) Israeli preemptive strikes involving nuclear weapons would not destroy enemy state second-strike nuclear capabilities; and (d) Israeli retaliation for enemy
state conventional first-strikes would not destroy enemy state nuclear counter-retaliatory capability. From the standpoint of protecting its security and survival, this means that Israel should now take proper steps to ensure
the likelihood of (a) and (b) above, and the unlikelihood of (c) and (d). As was clarified by Project Daniel’s final report, “ Israel ’s Strategic Future,” it is always in Israel ’s interest to avoid nuclear war fighting
wherever possible.
But, for Israel , both nuclear and non-nuclear preemptions of enemy unconventional aggressions could lead to nuclear exchanges. This would depend, in part, upon the effectiveness and breadth of Israeli
targeting, the surviving number of enemy nuclear weapons, and the willingness of enemy leaders to risk Israeli nuclear counter-retaliations. The likelihood of nuclear exchanges would be greatest where potential Arab and/or
Iranian aggressors were allowed to deploy ever-larger numbers of certain unconventional weapons without eliciting appropriate and effective Israeli preemptions.
Should such an ill-considered deployment be allowed, Israel
could forfeit the non-nuclear preemption option. Its only alternatives to nuclear preemption would then be: (1) a no-longer viable conventional preemption; or (2) a decision to do nothing, thereby relying for security on the
increasingly problematic logic of nuclear deterrence. This means that the risks of an Israeli nuclear preemption, of nuclear exchanges with an enemy state, and of enemy nuclear first strikes could all be reduced by effective
Israeli non-nuclear preemptions.
LOUIS RENÉ BERES was educated at Princeton (Ph.D., 1971) and is the author of many books and articles dealing with nuclear strategy and nuclear war, including recent contributions to
International Security (Harvard), NATIV (Israel/Hebrew only) and Parameters (The Journal of the US Army War College). Professor Beres was Chair of “Project Daniel,” which submitted its private report on ISRAEL ’S STRATEGIC
FUTURE to former Israeli Prime Minister Sharon on January 16, 2003.
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